Hunting for Re-Entrancy Attacks in Ethereum Smart Contracts via Static
  Analysis by Chinen, Yuichiro et al.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
01
02
9v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  2
 Ju
l 2
02
0
Hunting for Re-Entrancy Attacks in Ethereum
Smart Contracts via Static Analysis
Yuichiro Chinen1, Naoto Yanai1, Jason Paul Cruz1, and
Shingo Okamura2
1 Osaka University, 1-5 Yamadaoka, Suita, Osaka, Japan
2 National Institute of Technology, Nara College, Nara 639-1080, Japan
Abstract. Ethereum smart contracts are programs that are deployed
and executed in a consensus-based blockchain managed by a peer-to-
peer network. Several re-entrancy attacks that aim to steal Ether, the
cryptocurrency used in Ethereum, stored in deployed smart contracts
have been found in the recent years. A countermeasure to such attacks is
based on dynamic analysis that executes the smart contracts themselves,
but it requires the spending of Ether and knowledge of attack patterns
for analysis in advance. In this paper, we present a static analysis tool
named RA (Re-entrancy Analyzer), a combination of symbolic execution
and equivalence checking by a satisfiability modulo theories solver to an-
alyze smart contract vulnerabilities to re-entrancy attacks. In contrast to
existing tools, RA supports analysis of inter-contract behaviors by using
only the Etherum Virtual Machine bytecodes of target smart contracts,
i.e., even without prior knowledge of attack patterns and without spend-
ing Ether. Furthermore, RA can verify existence of vulnerabilities to
re-entrancy attacks without execution of smart contracts and it does not
provide false positives and false negatives. We also present an implemen-
tation of RA to evaluate its performance in analyzing the vulnerability
of deployed smart contracts to re-entrancy attacks and show that RA
can precisely determine which smart contracts are vulnerable.
Keywords: Ethereum · Smart Contracts · Static Analysis · EVM · Sym-
bolic Execution · SMT Solver
1 Introduction
Ethereum. Ethereum, which is often described as “the world computer,” is
a global, open-source platform for decentralized applications and execution of
programs called smart contracts, which are software programs recorded on the
Ethereum blockchain3 and executed by the Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM).
The EVM is a virtual machine that runs codes called EVM bytecodes and is
the runtime environment for smart contracts in Ethereum. Ethereum enables
3 Hereafter, “contract” and “smart contract” are used interchangeably but have the
same meaning. Likewise, “the blockchain” will be used to refer to the Ethereum
blockchain, unless otherwise specified.
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developers to build smart contracts with built-in functions and gain the benefits
of cryptocurrency and blockchain technologies.
Research Motivation. The blockchain is decentralized and transparent by
nature, and thus anyone can read the bytecodes of deployed contracts. Moreover,
smart contracts typically contain financially valuable data and therefore create
a criminogenic environment for adversaries. The attack on “The DAO” on June
2016 is the most infamous case of an attack on smart contracts. In the attack,
a vulnerability called re-entrancy, where the main contract calls an external
contract which again calls into the calling contract within a single transaction,
was utilized to steal more than 60 million US Dollars worth of Ether. With
the transparency of the Ethereum blockchain, the vulnerabilities of deployed
contracts can be utilized permanently as a springboard to attacks. Indeed, many
attacks [1] and honeypots [2] have been found on Ethereum in the past years.
Security Analysis of Smart Contracts. Based on these backgrounds,
program analysis for the security of Ethereum smart contracts is an urgent and
significant research theme. In this paper, we focus on the analysis of EVM byte-
codes of smart contracts instead of their corresponding source codes. Analysis
of bytecodes brings a number of advantages: (i) the analysis is independent of a
high-level language that is periodically updated, and (ii) bytecodes can be ob-
tained directly from the blockchain even if the corresponding source codes are
unpublished. Using static analysis, analysts can easily judge whether a deployed
contract has benign or malicious codes, e.g., vulnerable or honeypots.
In early literature on analysis of EVM bytecodes, formal verification [3,4,5,6,7]
is a leading approach for verifying a specification of bytecodes and symbolic
execution [8,9,10,11,12] is used for exploring bytecodes in a depth-first search
fashion by extracting control flow graphs (CFGs). To the best of our knowl-
edge, formal verification hovers at a level of just an abstraction of Ethereum
bytecodes despite providing precise verification in general. In other words, using
formal verification to analyze vulnerabilities in their entirety is difficult. More-
over, according to Weiss et al. [13], rigid formal verification is often dismissed
as it puts too high demands on analysts who are not experts in formal verifica-
tion. On the other hand, symbolic execution can potentially support analysis of
vulnerabilities via extraction of CFGs. Several prior works [8,9,10] succeeded in
analyzing some vulnerabilities, such as to re-entrancy attacks. However, symbolic
execution only outputs CFGs from programs to be analyzed and does not sup-
port detection of the vulnerabilities themselves. Accordingly, analysis becomes
often heuristic if an infeasible path exists in the programs. In particular, anal-
ysis results may produce many false positives and false negatives because of an
infeasible path [14].
A recent work [15] has found re-entrancy attacks that undermine existing
analysis tools [5,6,8] by creating a new contract or calling a different function
via an external contract. Although a monitoring tool was also proposed in the
same paper as a countermeasure against those attacks, the tool performs moni-
toring based on dynamic analysis and is therefore unable to detect vulnerabilities
unless the attacks occur during program execution. Accordingly, analysts need
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to implement and execute attack patterns by themselves in advance to check
for vulnerabilities. Although generic attack patterns [16] have been presented
formally, dynamic analysis remains impractical for analysis of smart contracts
because it often requires analysts to know how an attack is launched as well as to
spend Ether for the execution of contracts. Ideally, contracts should be analyzed
based on only their bytecodes, i.e., with the use of static analysis.
Research Goal. This paper aims to design an inter-contract static analysis
tool that (1) uses only EVM bytecodes as input, (2) eliminates false negatives
and false positives, and (3) does not require analysts to have a priori knowledge
of the attacks on contracts. For this goal, we focus on analysis of re-entrancy
attacks [15]. As evident in the attack on “The DAO”, re-entrancy attacks have a
significant impact and many contracts have been found to be vulnerable to these
attacks [6,8]. Considering findings on new attacks [15] in the recent years, our
research goal can prove to be important and useful. Moreover, the design of a
static analysis tool that is effective against new attacks is an open challenge [15].
Contributions. In this paper, we present a new static analysis tool named
Re-entrancy Analyzer (RA) for analyzing EVM bytecodes of smart contracts.
RA can analyze re-entrancy vulnerabilities via inter-contract flows, for instance,
by creating a new contract and calling a different function in the main contract
via an external contract. RA does not require analysts to have prior knowledge
of the attack patterns and pay Ether for analysis, and it does not provide false
positives and false negatives. These advantages are achieved via integration of
symbolic execution and equivalence checking with a satisfiability modulo theo-
ries (SMT) solver. Furthermore, we provide an implementation of RA and eval-
uate it by utilizing publicly available reference implementations of re-entrancy
vulnerabilities [15,17,18]. Our results confirm that, unlike Oyente [8], RA can an-
alyze precisely the vulnerabilities of deployed contracts against state-of-the-art
re-entrancy attacks [15]. We have released the source codes of RA via GitHub
(https://github.com/wanidon/RA) for reproducibility and as reference for fu-
ture works.
Our main contribution is the creation of a new symbolic execution method
named symbolic re-entrancy emulation, which emulates re-entrancy attacks by
connecting different contracts with each other. As will be described in detail in
Section 3, Oyente and its extensions [5,6] do not support inter-contract analysis,
for example, CFGs become fragments. On the other hand, we developed a module
that localizes stored data on the blockchain in each execution path and a module
that stacks a return address of an account information for each path. Using these
modules, RA can support inter-contract analysis and emulate the behavior of
re-entrancy attacks in a symbolic fashion via an internal implementation of a
dummy contract, i.e., a contract that executes other contracts.
As another important contribution, we developed a new method named vul-
nerability verification, which verifies vulnerabilities by utilizing the Z3 SMT
solver in the CFGs obtained from the symbolic re-entrancy emulation. In par-
ticular, on path conditions of the obtained CFGs, our method verifies whether
program behavior on paths for executions with re-entrancy attacks is identical
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to that without the attacks, i.e., behavior on normal executions. Using the meth-
ods above, RA can completely eliminate false positives and false negatives (See
Section 4 for details).
2 Technical Background
Ethereum Smart Contracts and EVM. In Ethereum, there are two kinds of
accounts, namely, an externally owned account (EOA) and a contract account.
EOAs have a private key that can be used to access the corresponding Ether or
contracts. A contract account has smart contract code, which an EOA cannot
have, and it does not have a private key. Instead, it is owned and controlled
by the logic of its smart contract code. In Ethereum, a smart contract refers
to an immutable computer program that is deployed on the blockchain and
runs deterministically in the context of the EVM. The immutability property
indicates that, similar to any data published on a general blockchain, smart
contract codes can be considered as trustworthy, i.e., once deployed, they cannot
be changed or deleted. The deterministic property indicates that the execution of
the coded functions of smart contracts will produce the same result for anyone
who runs them. Once deployed on the blockchain, a contract is self-enforcing
and managed by the peers in the network, i.e., its functions are executed when
the conditions in the contract are met. A smart contract is given an identity
in terms of a contract address. Using this address, it can receive Ether and
its functions can be executed. A contract is invoked when its contract address
is the destination of a transaction, which is a signed message originating from
an EOA, transmitted by the network, and recorded on the blockchain. Such
transaction causes a contract to run in the EVM using the transaction (and
transactions data) as input. The data indicate which specific function in the
contract to run and what parameters to pass to that function. To incentivize
peers to execute contract functions, Ethereum relies on gas, which is paid in
Ether, to fuel computations. The amount of gas needed to execute a transaction
is relative to the complexity of the computations, thus also preventing infinite
loops.
Smart contracts are typically written in a high-level language such as So-
lidity [17]. The source code is then compiled to low-level bytecode that runs
in the EVM. The EVM is a simple stack-based architecture. Its instruction set
is kept minimal to avoid incorrect implementations that could cause consensus
problems. The EVM is a global singleton, i.e., it operates like a global, single-
instance computer that runs in all peers in the network. Each peer runs a local
copy of the EVM to validate the execution of contract functions, and the pro-
cessed transactions and smart contracts are recorded on the blockchain.
Static Analysis of Programs. This paper focuses on the use of static
analysis composed of CFGs, SMT solver, and symbolic execution. A CFG rep-
resents feasible paths of a program as a graph and is utilized for optimization
by a compiler and static analysis of programs. Paths in a manner of sequential
execution without branches are called basic blocks and are identical to nodes of
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a CFG. Likewise, paths which are feasible via branches or jumps are represented
by edges to connect with nodes.
An SMT solver is a tool used for SMT problems. In contrast to satisfiabil-
ity problems represented by proportional logic, SMT problems are represented
by the first-order predicate logic which is more representative. By describing a
specification to be verified in some logic formally, an SMT solver verifies whether
a program satisfies the given specification.
Symbolic execution is a method that pseudo-executes a program by replacing
information unspecified from the program itself with symbolic values to represent
any value. Symbolic execution is composed of CFGs and an SMT solver, and
is suitable for analysis of smart contracts given that smart contracts utilize
information on blockchains which are outside of program codes. Specifically, a
condition to execute a path is called a path condition. Path conditions at the
beginning of program execution are valid, and a restriction is newly added to the
path conditions when a branch occurs. In a case where a path condition contains
a symbolic value, executing either one or both paths according to a condition,
i.e., the condition is satisfied or not, is decided by checking the satisfiability
of the condition. Path conditions are often represented by first-order predicate
logic, and their satisfiability is decided by an SMT solver described above.
3 Motivating Example and Technical Difficulties
In this section, we recall the fallback function and the re-entrancy attacks shown
by Rodler et al. [15] as our motivating example and then discuss the technical
difficulties in the analysis of the attacks.
3.1 Re-entrancy Problem
Fallback Function. Functions in Solidity are similar to classes in object-oriented
languages. There are four types of Solidity functions, namely, external, internal,
public, and private. A contract can have exactly one unnamed function called
a fallback function, which cannot have any arguments, cannot return anything,
and should have external visibility. The fallback function of a contract is exe-
cuted whenever the contract receives Ether without any data included. To receive
Ether and add it to the total balance of the contract, the fallback function must
be marked payable. If the contract does not have a fallback function, then it
cannot receive Ether through regular transactions and throws an exception. In
other words, if a contract is intended to not receive Ether, then the payable in
the fallback function can simply be removed. The fallback function is also trig-
gered if someone tries to call a function that does not exist in the contract, and
is often utilized for re-entrancy attacks.
Create-Based Re-Entrancy Attack. CREATE is an instruction that cre-
ates a new contract during execution of a contract (we call this the original
contract for convenience). The new contract consists of initialization codes and
the codes of its functions, and these codes are allocated by following a STOP
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instruction of the original contract. Once the initialization codes are executed,
data is initialized and then bytecodes of the new contract are returned. These
transitions via the initialization codes can be viewed as function calls by CRE-
ATE. Whenever a new contract is created, its constructor will be executed im-
mediately. In the attacks by Rodler et al. [15], a newly generated contract by
CREATE can issue further calls in its constructor to other contracts, including
malicious contracts, via CALL in the initialization codes. Here, the victim con-
tract first creates a new contract and then updates its internal state. The newly
created contract then calls a contract owned by an adversary. Consequently, the
adversary maliciously withdraws from the victim contract via the re-entrancy.
Cross-Function Re-Entrancy Attack.Whenever function calls such that
Ether is sent to an external contract account are executed, transactions are cre-
ated by the CALL instruction. In doing so, some data are sent together with the
transaction. The most significant four bytes are a function ID of a caller func-
tion, which is obtained from a function name and a type name of variables. The
callee contract obtains the function ID of the caller contract from the received
transaction and then decides a function to be executed by checking if the ID is
identical to that owned by the callee contract. If the callee contract does not own
a function ID specified by a transaction, a fallback function is executed as de-
scribed above. Cross-function re-entrancy attacks proposed by Rodler et al. [15]
are launched over multiple functions of the victim contract. Specifically, com-
pared to classical re-entrancy attacks that are launched by re-entering the same
contract via the same function, cross-function re-entrancy attacks are launched
by re-entering the same contract via a different function.
3.2 Technical Difficulties
We present some technical issues that need to be solved for the analysis of the
attacks described in the previous section. First, existing tools [5,6,8] do not pro-
vide support for generating running states of a callee contract via opcodes such
as CREATE and CALL, which utilize an external contract. Consequently, in these
tools, a caller contract is unidentified uniquely from the standpoint of a callee
contract and vice versa. More concretely, in the reference implementation of
re-entrancy attacks [15], an initialization code for the create-based re-entrancy
attack is executed in the aforementioned manner. In doing so, the initialization
code is on an infeasible path for existing tools. Moreover, because the main
body of the created code is determined by a return value from the initialization
code, the contract by CREATE is infeasible unless the initialization code is an-
alyzed. Thus, the behavior of the created contract including CALL is unknown
during offline analysis. Likewise, when an external contract is called by CALL
for the cross-function re-entrancy attacks [15], analysis should be executed in-
dependently for each contract because running states of a callee contract are
not generated. Consequently, utilizing path conditions for a caller contract is no
longer meaningful to analyze behavior of a callee contract. Furthermore, there
are many candidates of function combinations, and thus analyzing vulnerability
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to cross-function re-entrancy attacks becomes difficult due to the potential state
explosion [15].
Second, a method that evaluates vulnerabilities should be considered as well.
Several analysis tools [8,9,14] report feasible paths but do not provide evaluation
and detection of vulnerabilities. Accordingly, analysts often need to determine
if a contract is vulnerable in a heuristic fashion, and hence many false positives
and false negatives are produced. To eliminate false positives and false negatives,
analysis tools should include a method that can evaluate vulnerabilities without
requiring analysts to have prior knowledge of the attacks.
4 Design of RA
In this section, we present Re-entrancy Analyzer (RA), a new static analysis tool
for re-entrancy attacks on Ethereum smart contracts. We first describe our de-
sign concept and then describe symbolic re-entrancy emulation and vulnerability
verification as main processes, including their implementation.
4.1 Design Concept
The main idea of RA is to combine symbolic execution and an SMT solver in a
dual way, i.e., symbolic re-entrancy emulation and vulnerability verification.
First, modules that emulate re-entrancy attacks based on symbolic execution
are developed. Loosely speaking, by using an SMT solver to verify if conditions
for calling to an external contract and generating basic blocks are satisfied, RA
can identify which function is called. Consequently, RA can find path condi-
tions via symbolic execution, which transits executions to each basic block re-
cursively. Second, by utilizing the path conditions obtained from the emulation
process above, RA verifies if a resultant running state of a function call based
on a fallback function is equivalent with the original behavior, i.e., without the
fallback function, on the CFG obtained from the emulation. The verification is
done by the SMT solver. While symbolic executions in literature [5,6,8] report
only program behavior via CFGs obtained within a single contract, RA emulates
re-entrancy attacks including inter-contract behavior and then it verifies the vul-
nerability of these contracts to re-entrancy attacks. Consequently, in contrast to
the early literature, while the coverage of the analysis for re-entrancy attacks is
improved drastically, RA can analyze the vulnerabilities precisely, i.e., without
false positives and false negatives and without requiring analysts to have prior
knowledge of attack patterns, even for state-of-the-art re-entrancy attacks [15].
4.2 Tool Overview
The overview of RA is as follows. First, for the symbolic re-entrancy emulation,
RA generates CFGs from bytecodes whereby a newly created/called contract is
represented within a flow of the main contract via symbolic execution. Then,
for vulnerability verification, RA verifies whether the bytecodes are vulnerable
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Fig. 1. Overview of RA
to re-entrancy attacks by utilizing the Z3 SMT solver in accordance with path
conditions obtained from the symbolic re-entrancy emulation. To do this, the
following notions are defined for RA:
– Local-world state is owned by a basic block in local and stores global infor-
mation, such as balance or storage.
– Call stack is a stack that stores a return address to a basic block.
– Contract queue is a queue that stores bytecodes of a contract to be analyzed.
An overview of RA including the notions is presented in Fig. 1. RA mainly
consists of three modules, namely, CFManager, VM, and Verifier. The symbolic
re-entrancy emulation process is mainly conducted by CFManager and VM.
On the other hand, the vulnerability verification process is executed by Verifier
assisted by VM. We describe the role of each module below.
CFManager handles feasible paths by directly operating data structures in
a basic block for a CFG. A basic block contains the local-world state, the call
stack, as well as mnemonic of instructions, running states, and path conditions.
These give us information retrieved from the blockchain and return values, i.e.,
information obtained as a result of each caller/callee contract. Consequently,
symbolic execution of each block can be covered even through an external con-
tract. Then, VM receives a contract to be analyzed from the contract queue and
then executes instructions in accordance with basic blocks via CFManager and
checking conditions by Verifier. Finally, Verifier verifies existence of re-entrancy
vulnerability by utilizing the Z3 SMT solver with the information obtained by
VM. Based on these modules, the symbolic emulation for inter-contract analysis
is provided and then the verification of vulnerabilities is executed. The details
of each process are presented below.
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4.3 Symbolic Re-entrancy Emulation
The goal of this process is to generate a CFG completely via emulation of re-
entrancy attacks. In particular, the CFManager generates a CFG to represent
inter-contract behavior by recording basic blocks with transitions as edges. We
call such a CFG an extended CFG (ECFG) for convenience. In ECFGs, CREATE
and CALL instructions are utilized as separators of basic blocks in addition to
JUMP and STOP instructions. For convenience, let contracts to be executed by
CREATE and CALL be callers, and let contracts to be created or called be callees.
When CREATE appears, the symbolic execution is transited to its callee contract,
i.e., the initialization code. Similarly, when CALL appears, the execution is tran-
sited to a function of its callee contract. When STOP appears within the callee
contracts described above, the execution is returned to the caller contract. These
transitions of contracts are managed by VM.
We now describe the emulation process by RA in detail. For instance, for
analysis of the create-based re-entrancy attacks, VM extracts an initialization
code of a contract from variables of CREATE by specifying basic blocks via
the Z3 SMT solver, and CFManager transits the execution to those blocks in
accordance with branches decided by the Z3 SMT solver. By obtaining each
block and connecting them, CALL in the initialization code can be identified.
Moreover, VM can register the callee contract obtained by the initialization code
in the contract queue, and thus the whole contract can be symbolically emulated
in a recursive manner. On the other hand, for analysis of the cross-function re-
entrancy attacks, a function ID is symbolically executed as a symbolic value,
and then Verifier extracts the function ID to be executed by the Z3 SMT solver.
By giving the ID at the beginning execution and re-execution, combination of
any functions is representative.
4.4 Vulnerability Verification
The vulnerability verification is done by Verifier with path conditions obtained
from the emulation described in the previous section. Let functions to be verified
be f, g, where f contains a function call during the execution. We also denote
by I a set of path conditions where g is executed by taking over a result in
the execution of f , and by C a set of path conditions where f calls a fallback
function in a manner that the fallback function calls g and then f is executed
again with the result of g. The Verifier module can receive I and C from the
VM module. Then, the Z3 SMT solver verifies whether a program is vulnerable
or not as follows:
∃c ∈ C, ∀i ∈ I : ¬(c ≡ i). (1)
The procedure of the vulnerability verification is shown in Fig. 2. The withdraw
process is not executed when g is executed after executing f in a normal way,
i.e., executions in I. On the other hand, the withdraw process is executed due
to the re-entrancy on f whereby a fallback function calls g, i.e., executions in C.
RA decides that a contract is vulnerable if program behaviors are equivalent in
these executions. In particular, RA checks if there is no case where the behaviors
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Fig. 2. Process of Vulnerability Verification
are equivalent. Intuitively, the main difference between these cases is whether
instructions following CALL in f are executed before g. Specifically, g contains a
branch that determines whether the withdraw process is executed in accordance
with changing states on the blockchain, where path conditions at the end of
executions for both cases are different from each other.
4.5 Implementation
The main techniques for implementing the symbolic re-entrancy emulation of
RA are presented as the technical parts of the implementation below. In partic-
ular, we describe how basic blocks are controlled and function IDs are extracted
to reduce potential state explosion, which is one of the problems for static anal-
ysis tools according to Rodler et al. [15]. Several techniques for improving the
performance are presented as well. We also plan to release the source codes of
the whole implementation publicly via GitHub4.
Environment. RA is implemented on Python 3.7 and three modules, i.e., z3,
pysha3, and Graphviz. The z3 module provides APIs for the use of the Z3 SMT
solver on Python. The pysha3 module enables the use of the Keccak256 hash
function as a SHA-3 module. Finally, Graphviz provides support for drawing
CFGs. We also note that RA is independent of any specific compiler because it
uses bytecodes as input.
Control of Basic Blocks for CFManager. The method that represents
a branch with a conditional jump operation JUMPI is as follows. First, RA
adopts the depth-first search for finding feasible paths, and the CFManager owns
a data structure named dfs stack that stores candidates of basic blocks to be
searched. Then, the CFManager pops two variables for JUMPI from the dfs stack,
i.e., a jump address and a condition c for the jump where c is determined by
true or false. When c is a symbolic value, the z3 module decides whether ¬c
is satisfiable. If so, there exists a path that does not contain jump. Then, a
new block is generated by copying the current basic block and incrementing a
program counter, and the new block is newly recognized as the basic block. Next,
the solver decides whether c is satisfiable. If so, there exists a path that contains
4 The repository is publicly available. (https://github.com/wanidon/RA)
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jump. Then, the current basic block is copied as a jump block and the program
counter is set as the jump address. In the case that there exists a path with
jump but a path without jump does not exist, the current basic block is set as a
jump block. In contrast, if both a path with jump and that without jump exist,
then the jump block itself is stored in the dfs stack.
Extraction of Function ID for Verifier. Decision of a function ID for
Verifier is implemented as follows. First, a symbolic value function id is assigned
with the most significant four bytes for any transaction. The value is loaded onto
a contract to be analyzed, and hence paths are branched for each function by
comparing them with actual function IDs for the contract. Then, the function ID
can be obtained because a solution satisfying function id is obtained by deciding
the satisfiability of path conditions for all paths with the z3 module. If a CALL
instruction appears during the execution, CALLABLE is recorded as a state of
a basic block. The state of the basic block is inherited by all the descendant
paths. In extracting an actual function ID, ID of a function with function call is
recorded if the end state of a basic block is CALLABLE.
Speed-up Techniques. The entire performance of RA was improved by
using four optimization techniques. First, RA can verify combinations of function
calls described in Equation (1) in parallel. Second, a constraint is given on push
to a stack. A CALL instruction normally requires push to a stack in accordance
with success of a function call, i.e., 0 or 1. In contrast, a re-entrancy attack is
always executed after the success of a function call. Thus, RA always pushes 1,
i.e., the success of the function call, to a stack as assumed in the success of CALL
instruction. This enables RA to reduce the number of path conditions as a speed-
up technique. Third, because CALL is required to always succeed, a constraint,
i.e., a balance for any contract account is a positive value, is given on path
conditions only at the end states. The computational complexity can be reduced
drastically by giving the constraint at the end states instead of at each change
of the balance. Surprisingly, for analysis of several contracts, the computational
performance becomes ten times faster by using this constraint although we omit
the details due to space limitation. Finally, RA stops to analyze paths for some
stop instruction without the rollback process. In particular, a stop instruction
called REVERT contains the rollback about the blockchain related to a given
transaction. However, to the best of our knowledge, re-entrancy attacks never
occur in this case, thus RA no longer analyzes the remaining parts of such paths.
5 Evaluation
In this section, we show that RA can analyze inter-contract control flows pre-
cisely in comparison with execution of Oyente [8]. Comparison with other tools
is theoretically discussed in Section 6. The computational performance of RA
for analysis is also shown.
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5.1 Case Studies
As case studies, we test RA with reference implementations of the re-entrancy
attacks by Rodler et al. [15] and known re-entrancy vulnerabilities [17,18]. The
goal of these studies is to clarify the ability of RA to perform inter-contract anal-
ysis. The codes of the reference implementations of the re-entrancy attacks [15]
are publicly available5.
Creation of Contracts. On a CFG output by RA for a contract created
via CREATE, the execution is transited to a callee contract on the basic block
(denoted by the red box), and the execution is returned on the basic block
(denoted by the green box). In contrast, Oyente cannot transit execution into the
initialization code, i.e., a created contract, in a symbolic manner. The remaining
parts of the CFG are identical to a CFG output from Oyente. Consequently,
RA can handle a function call by extracting the initialization codes on CREATE
instructions.
On a CFG output by RA on analysis of the reference implementation of the
create-based re-entrancy attack, the execution is transited/returned to/from a
callee contract on the basic block. This confirms that, unlike Oyente, RA provides
analysis of create-based re-entrancy attacks in an inter-contract fashion.
Call of Contracts. Suppose that an adversary utilizes a contract with only
CALL instructions. In particular, because there are two basic blocks, two function
calls and two transitions to the caller are identified according to the analysis
results of RA. These results confirm that RA provides analysis of cross-function
re-entrancy attacks in an inter-contract fashion.
5.2 Vulnerability Analysis
The performance of RA is evaluated by using it to analyze the vulnerability of
a number of deployed contracts to re-entrancy attacks. In particular, the tar-
get contracts included in the evaluation are the Fund contract in the official
document of Solidity [17], a contract named KnownReentrancy obtained from
the code of “Reentrancy on a Single Function” published on the webpage of
“Ethereum Smart Contract Best Practices” [18], the Bank contract based on
create-based re-entrancy attack [15], the Token contract based on cross-function
re-entrancy attack [15], and a contract named KnownCrossFunction obtained
from the code of “Cross-function Reentrancy” published on “Ethereum Smart
Contract Best Practices”. Both Fund and KnownReentrancy contain a single
contract. Bank contains three contracts, two of which are benign, i.e., not vul-
nerable. Token contains twelve contracts, eleven of which are benign and only
one contract is vulnerable. Finally, KnownCrossFunction contain one vulnerable
contract and one benign contract because the cross-function re-entrancy attack
needs “cross” calls between different contracts. Several contracts include mul-
tiple functions and hence analysis of re-entrancy attacks becomes complicated
due to combinations of function calls as described in Section 3.2. In doing so, the
5 https://github.com/uni-due-syssec/eth-reentrancy-attack-patterns
Title Suppressed Due to Excessive Length 13
Table 1. Results of Analysis of Contracts Vulnerable to Re-Entrancy Attacks: The
Benign Functions and Vulnerable Functions columns represent the number of benign
functions and vulnerable functions in the contract, respectively. The true positive rate
is denoted by TPR, false positive rate by FPR, true negative rate by TNR, and false
negative rate by FNR.
Contract
Code
Length [Byte]
Benign
Functions
Vulnerable
Functions TPR [% ] FPR [% ] TNR [% ] FNR [% ]
Fund [17] 356 0 1 100 0 0 0
Known
Reentrancy [18] 365 0 1 100 0 0 0
Bank [15] 1694 2 1 100 0 100 0
Token [15] 2516 11 1 100 0 0 0
KnownCross
Function [18] 680 1 1 100 0 100 0
goal of this evaluation is to determine whether RA can precisely identify both
vulnerable contracts and benign contracts.
The results are shown in Table 1. According to the table, RA can precisely
verify all the existing vulnerabilities without false positives and false negatives.
In other words, in addition to being able to analyze contracts that are vulnerable
to re-entrancy attacks, RA can also analyze contracts that are not vulnerable,
as confirmed by the true negative rate. This precise evaluation for verification of
vulnerabilities was obtained by the use of the Z3 SMT solver with path conditions
obtained from symbolic execution.
5.3 Computational Performance
We now present the computational performance of RA for analysis of re-entrancy
attacks. The performance was measured by utilizing the time.perf counter func-
tion as an average of ten executions. The environment for measurement is as
follows: iMac 21.5-inch, 2017 with 3.6GHz Intel Core i7 processor, 32GB mem-
ory, and Radeon Pro 560 4GB as GPU. The measurement was done by im-
plementing parallel-processing. As can be seen in Table 2, the computational
time for analysis becomes larger in proportion to the number of function calls.
Surprisingly, analysis of Bank is fast even with its code length because Bank is
based on create-based re-entrancy attack, i.e., the majority of its codes to cre-
ate a contract and the function call are restricted to call the created contract.
In contrast, Token is based on cross-function re-entrancy attack and its code
length and variation of function calls are large. Nevertheless, RA was still able
to analyze Token within reasonable time.
6 Discussion
In this section, several considerations such as comparison to other existing tools
and the current limitations of RA are discussed.
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Table 2. Computational Time of RA for Analysis: The Combinations of Functions
column represents the number of combinations of function calls in the contract.
Contract Code Length [Byte] Combinations of Functions Time [sec]
Fund [17] 356 1 20.750
KnownReentrancy [18] 365 1 23.003
Bank [15] 1694 3 47.579
Token [15] 2516 12 519.676
KnownCrossFunction [18] 680 2 37.705
Table 3. Comparison of RA and Other Analysis Tools: • indicates the tool can detect
the attack, ◦ indicates the tool cannot detect the attack, and ⊘ indicates the tool can
potentially detect the attack but did not provide a discussion in its paper.
Tool Static Analysis Cross-Function Create-Based Analysis Target
Oyente[8] Static ◦ ◦ EVM
Securify [5] Static ◦ ◦ EVM
Annotary [13] Static ⊘ ⊘ Solidity
Sereum [15] Dynamic • • EVM
ÆGIS [16] Dyanmic • ⊘ EVM
RA Static • • EVM
Comparison to Other Analysis Tools. Table 3 shows a comparison of
different tools in terms of their ability to detect re-entrancy attacks discovered
by Rodler et al. [15]. Oyente [8] and Securify [5] cannot detect such re-entrancy
attacks. In particular, Oyente fails to detect the vulnerabilities, while Securify
produces false alerts due to its conservative policy. Sereum and ÆGIS can poten-
tially detect the vulnerabilities, but they are based on dynamic analysis. Finally,
Annotary is a static analysis tool that can deal with CREATE and CALL instruc-
tions. Thus, it can potentially detect the re-entrancy attacks, but its paper did
not discuss re-entrancy attacks. Moreover, Annotary’s analysis target are Solid-
ity codes and thus it may experience difficulties in analyzing deployed contracts.
Computational Complexity for Vulnerability Verification. Let the
number of functions with function call be Fn, the number of those paths be Fp,
the number of any function be Gn, and the number of those paths be Gp. Here,
the number of functions to be executed in the first step is Fn and its resulting
number of the end state for each execution is Fp. Then, in the second step, Gn
functions are executed in proportion to the number of the end states, and the
number of the end states of Gn is Gp. Consequently, the order complexity to
obtain path conditions at the end of process is O(FnFpGnGp). By parallelizing
the process, the complexity is O(GnGp) because all combinations of function
calls can be parallelized. To compute path conditions using Equation (1), RA
decides whether two sets, i.e., C and I, of the path conditions obtained from
combinations of one function have an identity relation between i ∈ I and c ∈ C.
In doing so, the order complexity is O(FnFpG
2
n
G2
p
), which is smaller than the
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complexity to obtain path conditions at the end states. The execution time for
analysis is polynomial time. RA is expected to be utilized for analysis of contracts
developed by users in realistic time as shown in Section 6.
Extension to Analysis of Delegated Re-Entrancy Attacks. Rodler et
al. [15] presented delegated re-entrancy attacks where a contract invokes another
contract as a library within instructions that utilize contracts as an external li-
brary, e.g., DELEGATECALL or CALLCODE. These instructions are currently not
implemented in RA, but RA can be extended to analyze delegated re-entrancy
attacks by introducing these instructions. The main technical difficulty in analy-
sis of delegated re-entrancy attacks is that it is unknown which library contract
will be used [15]. This difficulty is also a problem in analyses of create-based and
cross-function re-entrancy attacks, which have been overcome already in RA.
Limitations. The current implementation of RA has three limitations. First,
analysis of gas is not considered. Thus, contracts that restrict gas consumption
may not be analyzed precisely. Second, a case where multiple contracts are tightly
coupled with each other, i.e., more than two contracts are strongly interdepen-
dent, is out of the scope of RA. Finally, bytecodes of contracts cannot include
symbolic values. Accordingly, a case where created contracts are different for
each execution is not considered. Improving the points described above is our
ongoing work.
7 Related Works
In this section, we recall early literature on security analysis of Ethereum smart
contracts in terms of symbolic execution and formal methods as static analysis.
Then, we describe several multidisciplinary approaches proposed in the past few
years as additional related works. Interested readers are advised to read the
survey paper [19] for details on EVM analysis.
Symbolic Execution. Symbolic execution of Ethereum smart contracts was
originally started by Oyente [8]. Although there are many subsequent works [9,10,11,12],
these works do not perform inter-contract analysis. Furthermore, analysis of re-
entrancy attacks is often heuristic and thus Oyente often produces many false
positives. Extensions of Oyente that support readability of outputs from sym-
bolic execution have been proposed [20,21], and the usability of RA can be
potentially be improved in a similar way.
The closest work to RA is Annotary [13], which can analyze inter-contract
behavior via both symbolic executions of EVM bytecodes and the Z3 SMT solver.
The major difference of Annotary from RA is that Annotary mainly targets
analysis of Solidity codes. In other words, RA mainly checks if deployed contracts
are secure or not, while Annotary supports developers in implementing secure
codes. Although the authors of Annotary did not consider the new attacks by
Rodler et al. [15], we consider their idea and work to be elegant nonetheless.
ETHBMC [22] and VerX [23] are recent state-of-the-art works that verify
properties of Ethereum. VerX is similar to Annotary in terms of taking Solidity
codes as input and dealing with external contracts. Similar to Annotary, the new
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attacks by Rodler et al. [15] were not considered in VerX. On the other hand,
ETHBMC takes EVM for symbolic executions and its motivation is rather close
to that of RA. However, ETHBMC mainly focuses on parity vulnerability.
Formal Methods. Formal verification of EVM was motivated by Bhargavan
et al. [3], and EVM was correctly formalized as KEVM [4]. However, verifica-
tion of the security is challenging in general, and the existing works [5,6] do
not provide support for inter-contract analysis, which is the main target of our
work. As more theoretical approach, Grishchenko et al. [7] formalized several
attacks, including re-entrancy attacks, as well as formalization of EVM. Their
formalization inspired the vulnerability verification of RA.
Multidisciplinary Approaches. NeuCheck [24] can rapidly analyze Solid-
ity source codes by extracting a syntax tree on a cross-platform environment.
TokenScope [25] can detect vulnerabilities by identifying tokens that have a
different specification from the ERC20 token. SMARTSHIELD [26] is a byte-
code rectification system that fixes security-related bugs automatically. Qian et
al. [27] presented an automated re-entrancy detection framework based on ma-
chine learning. The techniques in these multidisciplinary works can be used to
potentially improve RA. Finally, ILF [28] and ContractWard [29] use a combi-
nation of machine learning and symbolic execution to improve testing coverage.
These works are expected to have improved performance if they deploy RA as
a building block.
8 Conclusion
In this paper, we introduced RA, a static analysis tool that provides inter-
contract analysis of the EVM bytecodes of Ethereum smart contracts to detect
vulnerabilities to state-of-the-art re-entrancy attacks [15]. Using RA, analysts
do not need to have prior knowledge of re-entrancy attacks to detect them. To
create RA, we designed modules that represent inter-contract CFGs by the sym-
bolic re-entrancy emulation and the vulnerability verification with the Z3 SMT
solver to verify the re-entrancy vulnerability of deployed contracts. We also con-
ducted experiments on deployed contracts and confirmed the performance of RA
by precisely identifying combinations of contracts with and without vulnerabili-
ties. The aforementioned performance could be obtained by virtue of high-level
combination of the symbolic execution and the Z3 SMT solver.
As future work, we plan to extend RA for a case in which a fraction of con-
tracts to be verified and external contracts becomes many-to-many. If successful,
RA will be able to deal with more complicated attacks that can be proposed in
the future. Moreover, we plan to design capabilities that check for vulnerabili-
ties aside from re-entrancy, such as time-dependent vulnerability which utilizes
a timestamp for each block. We believe that the inter-contract analysis capa-
bility of RA can potentially identify such a vulnerability. Finally, we will also
try to improve the computational performance of RA by reusing parts of the
computations for vulnerability verification.
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Code Availability The source code of RA is available in GitHub:
https://github.com/wanidon/RA.
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